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OVERCHARGING
Kyle Graham

The prosecutors in several recent high-profile criminal cases have been
accused of “overcharging” their quarry.1 These complaints have implied—and
sometimes expressly asserted—that by “overcharging,” the prosecutors engaged
in socially undesirable, illegitimate, and even corrupt behavior.2 United States
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia also weighed in on the “overcharging”
phenomenon not long ago, describing this practice as a predictable though
regrettable aspect of modern plea bargaining.3
Unfortunately, many of these commentators either have failed to explain
precisely what they meant by “overcharging,” or have used the same word to



Assistant Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law.
E.g., John Dean, Dealing With Aaron Swartz in the Nixonian Tradition: Overzealous
Overcharging
Leads
to
a
Tragic
Result,
JUSTIA
(Jan.
25,
2013),
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/01/25/dealing-with-aaron-swartz-in-the-nixonian-tradition (stating,
as to the recent prosecution of Aaron Swartz, the “case was seriously, unnecessarily, and brutally
overcharged,” with the prosecutors “using a sledgehammer for something that was merely worthy
of a slap on the wrist”); David Friedman, Overcharging: The Aaron Swartz Case, IDEAS (Jan. 24,
2013, 7:51 AM), http://daviddfriedman.blogspot.com/2013/01/overcharging-aaron-swartzcase.html; Emily Bazelon, When the Law Is Worse Than the Crime, SLATE (Jan. 14, 2013, 3:59
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2013/01/aaron_swartz_suicide_prosecutors_
have_too_much_power_to_charge_and_intimidate.html (describing the Swartz prosecution as an
instance of “egregious overcharging of crimes by the U.S. attorney’s office in the name of setting
an example.”); John R. Lott Jr., Where’s the ‘Probable Cause’?, THE NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE
(April 13, 2012, 2:45 PM), www.nationalreview.com/articles/295984/where-s-probable-causejohn-r-lott-jr (observing that the prosecutor of George Zimmerman, charged with the murder of
Trayvon Martin, “has most likely deliberately overcharged, hoping to intimidate Zimmerman into
agreeing to a plea bargain.”); John Schwartz, Severe Charge, With a Minimum Term of 25 Years,
N.Y. TIMES (April 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/us/zimmerman-faces-seconddegree-murder-charge-in-florida.html (quoting a defense attorney’s suggestion that Zimmerman
may have been “overcharged”); Scott Bonn, Casey Anthony trial was a case of overzealous
prosecution: Death penalty was a bar too high, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 7, 2011, 4:00 a.m.)
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/casey-anthony-trial-case-overzealous-prosecution-deathpenalty-bar-high-article-1.160804#ixzz2Lmmfm9QN (“Arguably, the prosecution ‘overcharged’
the case against [Casey] Anthony [by charging her with first-degree murder] and would have been
better off going with a charge of nonnegligent manslaughter or even second-degree murder.”); Is
O.J. Being Overcharged?, SENTENCING LAW & POLICY (Sept. 18, 2007, 7:56 PM),
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2007/09/is-oj-being-ove.html.
2
E.g., Dean, supra note 1; Bazelon, supra note 1. See also United States v. Robertson, 15
F.3d 862, 876 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“The practice of overcharging a defendant involves an
abuse of the prosecutor’s generally unreviewable discretion.”) (footnote omitted).
3
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1372, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (surmising that plea
bargaining “presents grave risks of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels an
innocent defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense.”).
1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2227193

describe different types of charging practices.4 The various meanings given to
“overcharging,” when the term is defined at all, have made it difficult to ascertain
what this practice entails, why it is improper, and who the worst offenders are.5
This essay aims to improve the ongoing conversation about overcharging
in two ways: first, by disentangling and fleshing out the core meanings of this
term; and second, by proposing some metrics to identify prosecutors who
chronically overcharge. As to the first of these matters, this essay explains how
the term “overcharging” can communicate three different criticisms of
prosecutorial practices. The first approach toward overcharging objects to the
allegation of crimes without adequate proof. A second criticism resembles the
first in that it holds criminal charges to some objective or other extrinsic standard
of propriety, but differs in that it is concerned with a lack of proportionality
between the nature or consequences of the charges in a case on the one hand, and
the gravamen of the defendant’s alleged misconduct on the other. A third
conception of overcharging combines objective and subjective elements. This
perspective also perceives inadequate proof or a lack of proportionality, but
particularly condemns a prosecutor’s conscious decision to allege overstated
charges in order to maneuver the defendant into a plea bargain in which some or
all of the charges will be dismissed or reduced. As detailed below, each of these
basic criticisms has its strengths and shortcomings, which may explain why they
are commonly merged or strung together. Yet the differences matter, especially
because some perceived solutions to overcharging address only one or two of
these critiques.
Next, this essay proposes and then applies a rudimentary methodology for
tracking how often particular prosecuting authorities overcharge. Some
commentators have said that it is impossible to spot overcharging in a given case,
at least without an admission by the prosecutor involved.6 Perhaps this is true. But
4

WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES AND COMMON PRACTICES
19 (1985) (“even when the same term [overcharging] is used it often has different meanings.”);
Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in the Charging Function, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 1259, 1279 (2011) (“it is not completely clear what ‘overcharging’ means, or why
the practice is illegitimate.”). See also SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF
DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950–1990 91 (1993) (“The issue of overcharging is very
complicated. The term has several meanings.”); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea
Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 41 (1983)
(“ ‘Overcharging’ is an ambiguous term.”)
5
See Is O.J. Being Overcharged, supra note 1 (“As many know (through few will admit),
some — only a few? many? most? — prosecutors are willing and perhaps eager to file as many
charges as they plausibly can in order to create bargaining leverage and bargaining room for
inevitable plea discussions.”)
6
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 454 U.S. 357, 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (opining that
“[n]ormally . . . it is impossible to show that” a prosecutor is engaging in overcharging); Bennett
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perhaps patterns of overcharging can be gleaned from larger collections of cases.
Toward this purpose, this essay presents an original review of several years’
worth of federal charging and conviction data. This study reveals the United
States Attorney’s offices that have produced patterns of charging and conviction
over this span that raise yellow, if not red flags regarding systemic overcharging.
Although these results admittedly do not establish frequent overcharging on their
own, they do point toward those offices that have built charging and conviction
records that may warrant further scrutiny.
This essay does not offer a prescription for ending or abating
overcharging, however that term is defined.7 Hopefully, though, the brief
discussion below will lay a foundation for increasingly cogent consideration of
overcharging, identification of prosecuting authorities who consistently
overcharge, and potential responses to the practice.
I. WHAT IS “OVERCHARGING”?
The word “overcharging,” as directed at prosecutorial charging practices,
first appeared in the academic literature in the mid-1960s.8 Shortly thereafter, in
1968, Professor Albert Alschuler devised a basic vocabulary for overcharging that
remains influential today.
A. “Horizontal” and “Vertical” Overcharging
In his article The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining,9 Professor
Alschuler described two different types of overcharging: “horizontal”
overcharging and “vertical” overcharging.10 As Alschuler described them, both
“horizontal” and “vertical” overcharging represent tactics that prosecutors employ
to catalyze plea bargains. Both practices set the stage for possible “charge
L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Charging Discretion, 20
FORD. URB. L.J. 513, 521 (1993) (“It is improper for prosecutors to use overcharging as a leverage
device to more readily obtain guilty pleas or to provide a trial jury a broader range of charges that
might more readily produce a compromise verdict. However, proving such improper prosecutorial
motivation is virtually impossible.”)
7
This article does not draw normative conclusions regarding overcharging, however
defined, although it does attempt to pinpoint the concerns that animate particular perceptions of
the practice. For a catalogue and critique of prescriptions for addressing overcharging, see DANIEL
S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
INNOCENT 19–33 (2012).
8
E.g., Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney,
55 GEO. L.J. 1030, 1035 (1967).
9
36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968).
10
Id. at 85–87.

3

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2227193

bargaining,” a type of plea bargaining in which the prosecutor agrees to dismiss or
reduce a charge or charges in exchange for the defendant’s guilty or no-contest
plea to another offense or offenses.11
The principal difference between “horizontal” and “vertical” overcharging
concerns their form. According to Alschuler, “horizontal” overcharging consists
of “multiplying ‘unreasonably’ the number of accusations against a single
defendant.”12 The practitioners with whom Alschuler spoke when preparing his
article described two subspecies of this practice: charging a defendant “with a
separate offense for every criminal transaction in which he has allegedly
participated”13 and “fragment[ing] a single criminal transaction into numerous
component offenses.”14
Regardless of the form that “horizontal” overcharging took, the main
criticism of the practice that Alschuler recorded lay in the prosecutor’s tactical use
of seemingly extraneous charges to triangulate toward a plea bargain. On this
point, Alschuler wrote that “[w]hen defense attorneys condemn this practice, they
usually do not disagree with the prosecutor’s evaluation of the quantum of proof
necessary to justify an accusation. Usually, they concede, there is ample evidence
to support all of the prosecutor’s charges.”15 To these attorneys, the perceived
unreasonableness of the charges owed instead to the fact that the “excess” counts
“are not usually filed against a single defendant because the prosecutor is
interested in securing . . . convictions [for these charges]. The charges may be
filed instead in an effort to induce the defendant to plead guilty to a few of the
charges, in exchange for dismissal of the rest.”16
Alschuler’s sources also related an alternative form of overcharging,
which he referred to as “vertical” overcharging. “Vertical” overcharging consists
of:

11

Kyle Graham, Facilitating Crimes: An Inquiry into the Selective Invocation of Offenses
with the Continuum of Criminal Procedures, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L.REV. 665, 686–87 (2011);
Stephen S. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 278–82 (1989) (discussing
“charge bargaining” by federal prosecutors).
12
Alschuler, supra note 9, at 85.
13
Id. at 87.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.

4

Charging a single offense at a higher level than the circumstances
of the case seem to warrant. The allegedly extravagant charge
usually encompasses, as a “lesser included offense,” the crime for
which the prosecutor actually seeks conviction. In this situation, as
in cases of horizontal overcharging, the claim is not that
prosecutors charge crimes of which the defendant is clearly
innocent; it is instead that they set the evidentiary threshold at far
too low a level in drafting their initial allegations. Usually, defense
attorneys claim, prosecutors file their accusations at the highest
level for which there is even the slightest possibility of
conviction.17
Thus, in both vertical and horizontal overcharging, the prosecutor
originally alleges a charge or charges that she subjectively does not want to
pursue to conviction, or is indifferent about prosecuting. Instead, the extraneous
or unduly severe allegations are put forward to incentivize the defendant to plead
guilty to another charge or charges. The two practices differ in that horizontal
overcharging anticipates charge dismissals as part of a desired plea bargain, while
vertical overcharging envisages charge substitution in a plea deal. Furthermore, at
least as Alschuler characterized the practices, only vertical overcharging entails
charges premised “insufficient” proof, however sufficiency is to be measured.
Some modern commentators continue to recognize a basic distinction
between horizontal and vertical overcharging.18 This bifurcation is useful, but
lacks comprehensiveness and rigor. Alschuler’s description of “vertical”
overcharging, for example, does not account for the scenario in which the
prosecutor files a charge on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but with the intent
to substitute a lesser charge as part of a plea deal. If strategic “horizontal”
overcharging warrants condemnation even when premised on plentiful proof, why
doesn’t this example involve comparable “vertical” overcharging? Likewise, why
doesn’t the allegation of ancillary, extraneous charges on insufficient proof
represent a subspecies of “horizontal” overcharging?

17

Id. at 86.
E.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the
Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 85 (2011) (“Scholars suggest that there are two basic
types of overcharging. Prosecutors can engage in either horizontal overcharging by filing charges
for distinct crimes resulting from similar offensive conduct, or vertical overcharging by charging
harsh variations of the same crime when the evidence only supports lesser variations.”); Ana
Maria Gutierrez, The Sixth Amendment: The Operation of Plea Bargaining in Contemporary
Criminal Procedure, 87 DEN. U. L. REV. 695, 697 n. 16 (2010) (“There are two types of
overcharging: horizontal and vertical.”).
18

5

The simple horizontal-vertical framework also fails to consider whether
overcharging may occur even when the prosecutor does not subjectively intend to
bargain a charge down, or away. As it stands, this taxonomy of “overcharging”
begs the question of whether, on its own, a departure from customary charging
practices,19 perceived disproportionality between the punishment attached to
charges and the moral blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct, or other
disconnects can support a claim of “overcharging.” If not, why not—particularly
when observers have been using the word “overcharging” to convey precisely
these criticisms?20
One cannot blame Professor Alschuler for these gaps. He sought to make
sense of what practitioners were telling him, not to define “overcharging” for all
purposes going forward. But it has become evident that modern commentators,
even as they sometimes use the horizontal-vertical terminology to describe the
specific forms that overcharging can take, also apply the “overcharging” label to
more fundamental criticisms of prosecutorial practices.
B. Three Meanings of “Overcharging”
Alschuler’s terminology provides a practical overlay to three more basic
understandings of overcharging.21 These descriptions often get merged or
concatenated in criticisms of perceived overcharging,22 but they merit parsing
insofar as they relate distinct though overlapping criticisms.
At a foundational level, claims of “overcharging” communicate one or
more concerns about charging decisions. One perception of overcharging
concentrates on the filing of criminal counts that lack adequate proof. Another
conception of overcharging dwells on the lack of proportionality between the
numerosity, gravamen, or sentencing consequences of a criminal charge or

19

See MCDONALD, supra note 4, at 19–20 (describing this as a type of “vertical”
overcharging).
20
E.g., Dean, supra note 1.
21
There may exist other, less commonly invoked definitions of “overcharging.” See, e.g.,
People v. O’Bryan, No. 292570, 2011 WL 165410 at *7 (Mich. App. Jan. 18, 2011) (“The test for
prosecutorial overcharging is not whether the prosecution’s choice of charges was unreasonable or
unfair, but whether the charging decision was made for reasons that were unconstitutional, illegal,
or ultra vires.”)
22
E.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 31 (2007) (“Prosecutors routinely engage in overcharging, a practice that involves
‘tacking on’ additional charges that they know they cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt or
that they can technically prove but are inconsistent with the legislative intent or otherwise
inappropriate.”).

6

charges on the one hand, and the character of the defendant’s conduct on the
other. While these first two approaches toward overcharging contrast charging
decisions against objective (though sometimes difficult to pin down) or other
extrinsic standards, a third critique is more concerned with the subjective
intentions of prosecutors. This view perceives overcharging when a prosecutor
deliberately uses excessive allegations to induce a plea bargain to lesser or
otherwise different charges.
These differences are important for practical as well as theoretical reasons.
Many of the solutions that have been proposed to end or abate overcharging do
not respond to all three concerns. Even if these suggestions perform as advertised,
therefore, they will not end the overcharging debate. For example, proposals to
reduce the “discount” that prosecutors can offer in connection with plea
bargains23 may not address “disproportionate” overcharging that is not intended to
coerce a plea. Meanwhile, the adoption of recommendations to raise the
evidentiary “floor” for criminal charges24 will not necessarily deter prosecutors
from engaging in overcharging in which charges are filed on ample proof, but
with the subjective intent that they be bargained away in exchange for guilty pleas
to other crimes. To provide a better sense of these possible disconnects, the
discussion below relates each conception of overcharging, and the concerns
behind it, in some detail.
1. Overcharging as Charging Without Adequate Proof
First, some descriptions of overcharging connect this term to the filing of
charges without sufficient proof.25 At its core, this critique attacks these charges
as falling short of an objective threshold for criminal allegations.
23

See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1254–56 (2008) (discussing how “fixed discounts” on pleas
would constrain overcharging).
24
See MEDWED, supra note 8, at 20–21 (discussing possible reforms to the probable-cause
standard for charging).
25
E.g.., Gifford, supra note 4, at 41 (observing that in its “strongest sense,” “overcharging”
“means filing charges for which the prosecutor does not even have sufficient evidence to support a
finding of ‘probable cause.’”); Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2012, at A24 (“Prosecutors regularly ‘overcharge’ defendants with a more serious crime than what
actually occurred”); Ed Brayton, How to Deal with Prosecutors Overcharging, FREETHOUGHT
BLOGS (Apr. 20, 2012), http://freethoughtblogs.com/dispatches/2012/04/20/how-to-deal-withprosecutors-overcharging/ (“One of the hallmarks of our criminal injustice system is overcharging
by prosecutors. They routinely charge defendants with far more than they can prove because that
puts maximum pressure on the person to cop a plea.”); Ted Rohrlich, High-Profile Losses Tarnish
Reputation of D.A.’s Office, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, at 1 (stating that in Los Angeles, “Elected
district attorneys may have gotten carried away by emotions or politics and charged defendants
with more crimes than they could prove,” a practice the article describes as “overcharging”).
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This approach addresses a coherent concern, at least in theory. Positive
ethical proscriptions, such as the American Bar Association Standards for the
Prosecution Function,26 prohibit the filing of charges on inadequate proof.27 With
good reasons; among them, the frequent filing of charges on bare minima of
evidence would lead to a greater number of erroneous convictions. Though juries
and judges play important roles in weeding out weak cases, prosecutors play a
necessary part in this process, too. If prosecutors entirely forfeited this
responsibility, it would remove an important screening phrase from criminal
proceedings. Furthermore, such an abdication would reduce the time and effort
that prosecutors (and defense attorneys, and judges, and juries) would spend on
their more meritorious cases, meaning that those cases, as well, might yield
“incorrect” outcomes more often.
That said, concerns about charging on inadequate proof may be
overstated.28 First, most prosecutors understand that it is unethical to bring
charges on patently inadequate grounds.29 Second, for good or for ill, modern
criminal codes are so robust that a prosecutor who cannot find probable cause for
some crime may need to have both her priorities and her bar license questioned.30
Third, from the prosecutor’s selfish perspective, filing paper-thin charges may
prove counterproductive. Assuming a relatively full docket, the prosecution of a
marginal case will draw the prosecutor’s attention, time, and other resources away
from the rest of her caseload. For little purpose; this form of overcharging will
often fail to induce convictions by way of a plea bargain or trial. The prevailing
ethical “floor” for a criminal charge is probable cause.31 Probable cause is not a

26

ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed.
1993) (“A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the continued
pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by
probable cause.”).
27
Gershman, supra note 4, at 1263; Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally Charged: The
Prosecutorial Charging Decision and the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2197
(2010) (“prosecutors in the vast majority of jurisdictions may file criminal charges so long as they
believe they are supported by probable cause, a standard that many scholars have derided as
woefully inadequate in filtering out the innocent.”).
28
See Lawrence S. Goldman, Prosecutorial Overcharging is Not “Regular,” WHITE
COLLAR
CRIME
PROF
BLOG
(Aug.
28
2012),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2012/08/see-here-see-here-see-here.html,
(“Federal prosecutors do not, in my view, ‘regularly’ overcharge defendants ‘with a more serious
crime than what actually occurred,’ at least in white-collar cases (although they often pile on
unnecessary if legally unjustifiable multiple charges).”).
29
See MCDONALD, supra note 4, at 22 (“charging a defendant without probable cause for
any of the charges filed would be unanimously condemned.”).
30
See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW (2008) (discussing a perceived surfeit of criminal offenses in contemporary criminal codes).
31
Medwed, supra note 27, at 2197.
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high standard of proof, and in a given case evidence that just satisfies probable
cause is usually detectably different from proof beyond a reasonable doubt.32
Charges that lack probable cause therefore may not convince a defendant to enter
a guilty plea, even to lesser charges. Instead, a significant percentage of
defendants will press for trials.33 And at these trials, the prosecutor cannot
reasonably expect the juries or judges to reliably return guilty verdicts to
overblown charges. Ultimately, then, a practice of routine overcharging promises
more work and more acquittals for the prosecutor.
Of course, one might reject the probable-cause standard for charges as too
low, and spot overcharging whenever a criminal count is supported by something
less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.34 Prosecutors sometimes misgauge a
case’s strength, meaning that this sort of overcharging probably happens more
often than would be ideal. Yet it may overstate the capabilities of prosecutors to
assume that they routinely file charges that they know just barely lack proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. As just stated, there usually exists a palpable
difference between evidence that barely meets the probable cause threshold and
evidence that amounts to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, it can be
difficult—sometimes impossible—to ascertain whether the evidence in a case
falls just north or south of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
The simple truth, then, is that in most cases, when prosecutors could
knowingly overcharge within the “inadequate proof” meaning of the term, this
tactic won’t induce a conviction; and when the tactic might work, a prosecutor
who presses charges typically won’t be aware that she is overcharging at all. Thus
most “true” overcharges, in the sense that a charge patently lacks proof sufficient
for a conviction, likely involve a prosecutor’s misunderstanding of the pertinent
law, or the facts of a case.35 These mistakes may involve professional negligence.
But they rarely entail a more sinister scienter.

32

Gershman, supra note 4, at 1266–70 (“the subjective probable cause standard is so
minimal that it offers very little protection from careless and reckless charging, to say nothing of a
prosecutor’s deliberate and bad faith charging”).
33
See Brooke A. Masters and Carrie Johnson, Corporate Scandals Yield Few Plea Deals;
Top Executives Take Best Shot in Court, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2004, at A1 (quoting a defense
attorney as saying, “If people believe they have been improperly charged or overcharged . . . they
want their day in court.”).
34
E.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 87 (rev. ed. 2012) (“The prosecutor is
also free to file more charges against a defendant than realistically can be proven in court, so long
as probable cause arguably exists—a practice known as overcharging.”)
35
See PAUL BENNETT, PROSECUTORIAL OVERCHARGING 1 (1979) (“Not all overcharges are
the result of the prosecutor’s deliberate abuse of charging discretion. The prosecutor may simply
be mistaken on the law or the facts in bringing more or higher charges than are justified. Another
possibility is that the law concerning a particular fact situation may be unclear. The prosecutor

9

All this said, certain circumstances may increase the likelihood of
conscious charging on inadequate proof. Most notably, as Alschuler’s description
of “vertical” overcharging implies,36 to the extent that an excessive charge
encompasses lesser-included offenses or possesses other attractive “landing spots”
for a plea bargain, these options reduce the risk of an all-or-nothing prosecution,
and encourage strategic overcharging.37 Meanwhile, high-profile cases invite
overreaching by prosecutors.38 In these matters, a prosecutor may succumb to
public clamor and charge a relatively serious offense, even upon only marginal
proof. A prosecutor who takes this route can blame any resulting acquittal or
reduction of charges at trial on the judge or jury, while still leaving open the
possibility of a subsequent plea bargain to lesser charges should the furor abate.
Furthermore, where there exists at least one “strong” charge in a case, a
prosecutor sometimes may not vet other, accompanying charges as carefully as
she should, or be tempted to file additional charges as plea-bargaining fodder.
Since there exists a high likelihood of a conviction on at least one count, the
prosecutor may regard the modest marginal effort associated with charging and
trying the other, weaker counts as more than offset by the possibility that these
additional charges will help convince a defendant to enter a guilty plea.39
In any event, it is difficult to pin down the pervasiveness of overcharging,
if defined as charges premised on insufficient proof. The rate of trial acquittals in
a jurisdiction might provide some indication, but there exist some obvious reasons
why this metric would fail to provide much insight into whether or not a
prosecuting authority chronically files factually thin allegations. Among them,
some crimes are simply harder to prove than others are; juries sometimes vote to
nullify, even in cases supported by adequate proof; and the quality of defense
representation varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. These and other extrinsic
complications present significant obstacles to gaining an accurate grasp of the
prevalence of this form of overcharging.

then resolves the ambiguity in his own favor and leaves it to the courts to say whether he was
wrong.”).
36
Alschuler, supra note 9, at 86–87.
37
See Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a
Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1953–54
(2006) (discussing the role that “landing points” play in plea bargaining).
38
See Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, BART shooting a trial by fire for new D.A., S.F.
CHRON., May 19, 2010, at C1 (stating, of a high-profile murder case against a former BART
police officer, “many police officers . . . think the case was overcharged”); Rohrlich, supra note
25.
39
Of course, a prosecutor may not want to “dilute” what the judge and jury might otherwise
perceive as a strong case by filing palpably weak additional charges.
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2. Overcharging as Filing Charges Disproportionate to the Crime
A second basic impression of overcharging uses the term to describe
charging decisions that either allege “too many” crimes, place too harsh a label on
the defendant’s conduct, or threaten punishment that seems too severe in light of
the factual allegations directed against the defendant.40 This take on overcharging
typically admits the legal sufficiency of a charge or charges, but attacks the
accusations directed against the defendant as being disproportionate to his or her
misconduct, in the sense that the charges are out of step with custom, moral
norms, or common sense.41
This perception of overcharging resembles the first in that both contrast
the prosecutor’s decision with an objective or extrinsic view of “proper”
charges.42 Furthermore, as with the first definition, this approach does not
necessarily implicate the practice of plea bargaining. A prosecutor can
overcharge, under this meaning of the term, regardless of whether she
subjectively intends to plea bargain some or all of the charges away, or pursue
them to conviction through trial practice. This view instead attacks the
prosecutor’s failure to properly exercise her discretion and make a reasonably
proportionate charging decision.
Like the first critique of overcharging, the second assessment applies a
plausible gloss to the term. But a conception of overcharging premised on a
perceived lack of proportionality suffers from the lack of a coherent, widely

40

This approach to overcharging permeated much of the criticism of the prosecution of
Aaron Swartz. E.g., Friedman, supra note 1 (commenting, on the recent criminal case against
hacker Aaron Swartz, “I do not know whether what Aaron Swartz did ought to have been
punished at all, but I think it would be hard to find anyone, including the prosecutor, willing to
argue that it ought to have received the punishment that the prosecutor threatened to impose.”).
41
These sentiments undergird a petition to remove the federal prosecutor who brought the
Aaron Swartz case, as well as the U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts who oversaw the
prosecution. The petition provides, in pertinent part, “A prosecutor who does not understand
proportionality and who regularly uses the threat of unjust and overreaching charges to extort plea
bargains from defendants regardless of their guilt is a danger to the life and liberty of anyone who
might cross her path.” We Petition the Obama Administration to: Remove United States District
Attorney Carmen Ortiz from office for overreach in the case of Aaron Swartz, WE THE PEOPLE
(Jan. 12, 2013), https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/remove-united-states-district-attorneycarmen-ortiz-office-overreach-case-aaron-swartz/RQNrG1Ck.
42
Here, this essay uses “extrinsic” to describe proportionality critiques that condemn a
charging decision as inconsistent with the observer’s personal views or values. These beliefs may
not admit to distillation into a single objective standard, but remain extrinsic to the prosecutor’s
subjective mindset at charging.
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accepted baseline for determining what amounts to “proper” charges.43 Without
an agreed-upon touchstone for “reasonable” charging decisions, this attack begs
infinitely debatable questions regarding what theories of criminalization and
punishment should apply generally, and in a given case. Moreover, even a
consensus as to basic principles does not necessarily yield agreement on the
specific charges and punishment terms that should adhere in particular cases.
This understanding of overcharging also leaves open whether the
“proportionality” inquiry should focus upon the number and nature of the charges
themselves, or on the specific penalties that attach to them; and if the latter,
whether the maximum or the “likely” penalties upon conviction merit more
attention. Put another way, critics of “disproportionate” prosecutions might spot
overcharging when prosecutors allege crimes that (1) somehow, on their face,
seem more numerous or serious than the defendant’s conduct warrants, even if the
defendant’s behavior technically satisfies the elements of the offense or offenses;
(2) carry maximum penalties that appear disproportionate—even if these
maximum penalties almost certainly would not apply to the defendant;44 or (3)
plausibly might lead to excessive punishment in the defendant’s specific case.
These matters often coincide; “excessive” charges commonly carry
“excessive” punishment, both in the abstract and as applied in a particular case.
But those who spot overcharging sometimes focus upon an especially
disproportionate aspect of a prosecution. This emphasis tends to hinge on the
speaker’s personal concerns. For example, one might justify a focus upon charges
qua charges on the ground that there exists no meaningful check on prosecutorial
discretion at the charging stage of a case. Once filed, the bare charges themselves
43

W.
David
Ball,
Defunding
State
Prisons
6
(January
2013)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2220028 (“there is no such thing as a ‘normal’
charge or ‘normal’ enforcement in a given case to which we could compare ‘over-charging’ and
‘over-enforcement’). See also Orin Kerr, The Criminal Charges Against Aaron Swartz (Part 2:
Prosecutorial Discretion), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16, 2013, 11:34 PM)
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/16/the-criminal-charges-against-aaron-swartz-part-2prosecutorial-discretion/ (observing that, in deciding what amounted to sufficient but not
excessive punishment in connection with the prosecution of Aaron Swartz, “we need a benchmark
of how much punishment was enough.”).
44
See, e.g., Alex Stamos, The Truth About Aaron Swartz’s “Crime,” UNHANDLED
EXCEPTION (Jan, 12, 2013), http://unhandled.com/2013/01/12/the-truth-about-aaron-swartzscrime/ (opining that Aaron Swartz was “massively overcharge[d],” since his “downloading of
journal articles from an unlocked closet [was] not an offense worth 35 years in jail.”); Lincoln
Caplan, Aaron Swartz and Prosecutorial Discretion, TAKING NOTE (Jan. 18, 2013, 10:06 AM)
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/aaron-swartz-and-prosecutorial-discretion/
(stating that federal prosecutors “go after defendants tooth and nail, overcharging them from the
abundance of criminal laws with sentences so severe and out of proportion to the crime that, as
now happens in 95 percent of criminal cases, the prudent choice is to cop a plea.”).
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may affect the accused’s reputation, not to mention the course of subsequent
proceedings.45 Alternatively, those who perceive in overcharging greater
opportunities for disparate treatment of judicial-system “insiders” and
“outsiders”46 may dwell on the maximum punishment attached to initial charges.
Outsiders, after all, may not know about lower “going rates” that may exist for
plea deals. Finally, observers most concerned about the prospect of defendants
being coerced into stilted plea bargains might concentrate upon the actual, as
opposed to theoretical punishment implicated by a charging instrument.
Because each commentator brings both her own baseline for “reasonable”
prosecution and a unique set of concerns to the overcharging debate, each puts her
own gloss on “overcharging” when using the word to attack a lack of
proportionality in a charging decision. As with the first conception of
“overcharging,” these variations tend to imbue the “proportionality” definition of
overcharging with a know-it-when-one-sees-it quality, such that it offers little
assistance in defining the precise boundaries of the term. It is unsurprising, then,
that there exists a third meaning of overcharging that grounds the proportionality
and inadequate-proof approaches by connecting them to specific actions taken by
prosecutors.
3. Overcharging as Prosecutorial Insincerity
A third conception of overcharging differs from the first two in that its
principal concern involves the knowing misuse of charges by prosecutors. This
view espies overcharging when a prosecutor files an “excessive” charge or
charges (in the sense that either the charges are disproportionate or they lack
adequate proof) without any subjective desire to pursue these offenses to
conviction. Rather, the prosecutor alleges these offenses as bargaining chips,
holding out the possibility of their dismissal or reduction in exchange for the
defendant’s entry of a guilty or no-contest plea to other charges.47 The
45

BENNETT, supra note 35, at 3 (“A . . . consequence of overharging is the effect that the
original charges may have upon sentencing judges, probation officers and parole boards, even if
they are dismissed as part of the plea agreement.”).
46
See generally Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (2006) (discussing this concern).
47
E.g., State v. Harvey, No. E2008–01081–CCA–R3–CD , 2010 WL 5550655, Tenn. Crim.
App. Dec. 30, 2010, at *28 (“Tennessee courts have referred to overcharging as a prosecutorial
practice of charging a defendant with a greater charge in seeking a conviction for a lesser-included
offense.”); RICHARD L. LIPPKE, THE ETHICS OF PLEA BARGAINING 31 (2011) (“When they
strategically overcharge, prosecutors do not simply respond to the evidence that individuals have
committed one or more crimes. Instead, they select charges partly with an eye to putting pressure
in defendants to plead guilty.”). In this same vein, the Commentary to the ABA Standards for the
Prosecution Function explains:
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prosecutor’s subjective interest in dismissing the surplus or extreme charges
thereby substantiates what might otherwise represent a nebulous “overcharging”
claim.
This critique of overcharging taps the unease that surrounds the practice of
plea bargaining generally.48 As one observer has noted, echoing arguments
directed against modern plea bargaining, this sort of overcharging “has a chilling
effect on the exercise of the constitutional right to trial. . . . Even innocent
defendants may be so overwhelmed by the degree or number of the charges
against them that they will forego the risks of trial for the certainty of a guilty
plea.”49 Of course, the coercion attendant to plea bargaining does not arise only
when a defendant has been overcharged. The distinctive concern associated with
overcharged cases involves a sense that the charges set too high a baseline for the
bargain, and thus create additional, undesirable “space” for coercion.
This understanding of overcharging also reflects some other special
concerns. To many observers, trials remain the preferred means of resolving a
criminal case, with plea bargains being only grudgingly accepted as a necessary
but decidedly second-best feature of criminal procedure landscape.50 Insofar as an
overcharged case, on its face, invites a plea deal to lesser charges, it appears to
reverse these preferences.51 This sort of overcharging also tends to call the
The chief criticism voiced by defense counsel with respect to the exercise of
prosecution discretion . . . is that prosecutors ‘overcharge’ in order to obtain
leverage for plea negotiations. Although it is difficult to give a definition of
‘overcharging’ in verbal form, it is clear that the heart of this criticism is a belief
that prosecutors bring charges not in the good-faith belief that they are
appropriate under the circumstances and with an intention of prosecuting them
to a conclusion, but merely as a harassing and coercive device, in the
expectation that a guilty plea will result and that it will not be necessary to
proceed to trial, verdict and sentence on all of the charges or at the degree of
crime originally stated.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 76
(3d ed. 1993).
48
This literature is too extensive to cite in full here. One leading work in this vein is
Stephen Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1987–91 (1992).
49
BENNETT, supra note 35, at 3.
50
HUSAK, supra note 30, at 23 (“Few knowledgeable commentators are prepared to defend
the justice of plea bargaining. . . . Presumably, plea bargaining survives because no one knows
how our penal system could function without it.”); Note, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: An End to
the Same Old Song and Dance, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 505, 506 (1999) (observing that “many legal
commentators and participants view plea bargaining as inevitable,” citing numerous articles to this
effect).
51
In an overcharged case, as that term is being used above, neither the prosecution nor the
defense necessarily desires a trial on all charges. The prosecutor may agree with the defense
assessment of the charges as too harsh, yet consider them sufficiently useful in securing the
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sincerity of the prosecution and its allegations into question.52 With tactical
overcharging, the prosecution invokes some crimes principally as procedural
devices, without any concomitant desire to obtain convictions for the offenses.
This practice connotes that a prosecutor may allege crimes for a variety of
purposes, aside from gaining a conviction for that particular offense. Although the
prosecutor does intend for these allegations to produce convictions for other
offenses, this instrumental use of criminal allegations suggests a broadening of
prosecutorial prerogatives that some may find troubling.53 Moreover, the repeated
allegation of certain crimes without an accompanying desire to convict defendants
of these offenses may erode the moral force of the criminal prohibitions
themselves.54
This assessment of overcharging, like the others, has its shortcomings. In
particular, the objective-subjective focus runs the risk of dodging the admittedly
difficult “proportionality” inquiry simply by punting this issue to prosecutors.55
With this take on overcharging, a tendency exists to look to the subjective
intentions of prosecutors not as merely substantiating a pre-existing claim of
disproportionality, but rather as setting the baseline for “reasonable” charges in
the first instance. This deference runs the risk that a prosecutor will be seen as
overcharging only when she is prepared to dismiss or reduce charges pursuant to a
plea deal. If this were true, prosecutors could duck all accusations of
“overcharging” simply by never agreeing to charge bargains. This result sounds
strange, as it should; yet it may follow from an approach toward overcharging that
allows prosecutors to define the term.
Of the three impressions of overcharging, the third is most conducive to
measurement, with the prosecutor’s dismissal of charges in connection with a
defendant’s cooperation in plea bargaining as to warrant the risk of an excessive sentence upon
conviction, should plea bargaining stall.
52
See BENNETT, supra note 35, at 4 (“the true horror of overcharging is that citizens are
being charged not on the basis of the evidence against them, but on the basis of pragmatic
considerations in the prosecutor’s office.”).
53
See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening / Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 33 (2002) (describing overcharging as a “particularly noxious form of dishonesty” that
occurs in connection with plea bargaining, with this noxiousness owing to the fact that “the public
in general, and victims in particular, lose faith in a system where the primary goal is processing
and the secondary goal is justice.”).
54
See Graham, Facilitating Crimes, supra note 11, at 705–07.
55
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 47, at 77 (observing that “[t]he line separating
overcharging from the sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion is necessarily a subjective one,
but the key consideration is the prosecutor’s commitment to the interests of justice, fairly bringing
those charges he or she believes are supported by the facts without ‘piling on’ charges in order to
unduly leverage an accused to forgo his or her right to trial.”).

15

defendant’s guilty or no-contest plea serving as a “tell.” But this take on
overcharging also presents some significant measurement challenges, as related
below.
II.

MEASURING OVERCHARGING

Criticisms of overcharging tend to come and go with high-profile cases in
which observers detect prosecutorial excess. The typically ad hoc, case-specific
nature of the resulting conversations has generated little understanding as to the
pervasiveness of this practice. Instead, the spare popular dialogue that surrounds
overcharging in general tends to involve glib assertions to the effect that
prosecutors “regularly” overcharge.56 These statements shed no light on issues
such as precisely how often overcharging occurs, or whether there exist
prosecuting entities that engage in this practice more or less often than others do.
If overcharging is a serious problem, this lack of information will frustrate
efforts to devise a solution. As the saying goes, it is difficult to fix something that
isn’t measured. Opacity as who overcharges most and least often will especially
hinder the development of pinpoint, as opposed to blunderbuss solutions. The
dearth of analysis on overcharging also denies observers of possible “best
practices” drawn from those prosecutors’ offices that rarely overcharge.
These gaps suggest the utility of metrics that might provide some insight
into the prevalence of overcharging within and across jurisdictions.
Unfortunately, the necessary data do not exist for at least some of these
measurements. For example, one might spot pervasive overcharging by
contrasting the likely sentences across a set of cases, as initially charged, with the
prosecution’s actual plea offers to the defense. Unfortunately, these reference
points rarely (if ever) appear in print, at least not for robust case cohorts.
Data that is even more basic may not exist for many jurisdictions. For
federal criminal cases, however, there exist a somewhat useful series of datasets.
Entries in this series, compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, relates charge-specific data for all criminal cases that terminate in United
States District Courts in a given fiscal year (October 1 to September 30). The data
include information such as the five “most serious” initial charges in each case,
and the dispositions of the five “most serious” charges at the time of case
termination.
The discussion below mines this data to propose a handful of
measurements that, at least when put together, point toward those federal judicial
56

E.g., Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, supra note 25.
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districts that merit further study either as possible hotbeds of overcharging, or as
offices that have tended to avoid this practice. The discussion relies upon seven
years of data from the AOUSC, reflecting cases that terminated between October
1, 2002 and September 30, 2009.57 The data have been collected into a single
dataset, referred to below as the “AOUSC Database.”58 This database consists of
623,430 records, each of which relates the disposition of charges filed against a
particular defendant in a specific federal case that terminated during this span.
The text below relates a series of studies that employ the AOUSC
Database to tease out the prevalence of overcharging in federal court. These
inquiries relate principally to the third understanding of “overcharging” presented
above, inclusive of its overlaps with the other two basic meanings afforded to the
term. Though this third conception of overcharging is principally concerned with
the prosecutor’s subjective intent, it helpfully carries an objective marker, in the
form of the prosecutor’s dismissal of charges in connection with a plea deal.
As a first step toward quantifying the prevalence of this type of
overcharging, the AOUSC Database was sorted, compressed, and trolled to
57

The datasets thus capture a time frame in which the charging practices of U.S. Attorneys
were governed by a memorandum issued by Attorney General John Ashcroft. This memo directed
prosecutors to typically “charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses
that are supported by the facts” of a case. MEMORANDUM FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN
ASHCROFT TO ALL FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 2 (Sept. 22, 2003). This approach has since been
superseded somewhat by a new policy advising that the charging decision “must always be made
in the context of ‘an individualized assessment of the extent to which particular charges fit the
specific circumstances of the case, are consistent with the purpose of the Federal criminal code,
and maximize the impact of Federal resources on the crime.’ ” MEMORANDUM FROM ATTORNEY
GENERAL ERIC HOLDER TO ALL FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 2 (May 19, 2010), quoting U.S.
Attorney’s Manual § 9-27.300. The effect of this shift in policy on individual districts’ charging
practices is admittedly unclear at this time.
58
The data referenced in the text above derive from a series of datasets that each contain
information regarding federal criminal cases that terminated in a given fiscal year (October 1 to
September 30), which the author has compiled into a single database (the “AOUSC Database,”
which remains in the possession of the author). The datasets comprising this database are as
follows: United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics
Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court—Terminated, 2003 [ICPSR
24153]; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics
Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court—Terminated, 2004 [ICPSR
24170]; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics
Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court—Terminated, 2005 [ICPSR
24187]; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics
Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court—Terminated, 2006 [ICPSR
24205]; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics
Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court—Terminated, 2007 [ICPSR
24222]; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics
Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court—Terminated, 2008 [ICPSR
29242]; and United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice
Statistics Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court—Terminated, 2009
[ICPSR 30784]).
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ascertain: (1) the frequency with which charges were dismissed (as opposed to
some other disposition) in cases that resulted in a guilty or nolo contendere plea to
one or more counts; (2) the frequency with which “most serious” charging
offenses, at the time of initial case filing, lost that status in cases that led to a
guilty or no-contest plea; and (3) the frequency with which charges under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c), which carries a five-year “mandatory minimum” sentence, were
dismissed in cases that entailed a defendant’s guilty or no-contest plea. The text
below relates the reasoning behind each of these metrics. Since the AOUSC data
include the particular federal judicial district in which each case terminated, and
since most cases within a given judicial district are filed by the local U.S.
Attorney’s office, the data permit the district-by-district comparison of charging
and conviction information.59
A. Charge Dismissals
First, a basic metric would examine the frequency of charge dismissals in
cases that terminated, in whole or in part, by a guilty or nolo contendere plea
(538,085 cases).60 The percentage of counts that reflect termination by dismissal
within these cases might provide a very rough take on the dynamics of charge
bargaining within a given jurisdiction. As performed on the AOUSC Database,
this analysis yielded the following list of jurisdictions with particularly low
dismissal rates:
Table I: Federal Judicial Districts with the Lowest Charge-Dismissal Rates
in Pled Cases, AOUSC Data, FY 2003–FY200961
District

FY 2003–FY2009
Dismissal Rate
5.6%
11.7%
15.1%
16.6%
18.8%

Rhode Island
Massachusetts
E.D. Pennsylvania
New Mexico
Maine
59

The data that comprise the AOUSC Database are admittedly imperfect. In addition to the
aforementioned five-count limitation, inputting errors and missing cases also appear within the
data. These shortcomings augur caution when using the data to draw minute distinctions.
Accordingly, the discussion below will focus on jurisdictions that lie at the extremes of various
rankings. This focus attenuates the risk of a material mischaracterization of a district’s charging
practices.
60
Here, and in the subsequent charts that relate the dismissal rates of charges brought under
18 U.S.C. § 924, the dismissal rates reflect all dismissals assigned either of the codes “1” or “D”
by the AOUSC. The two codes differ in that the latter reflects dismissals without prejudice.
61
AOUSC Database, supra note 58. The District of New Jersey had a dismissal rate of 23.2
percent, but an extremely high number of counts that reflected a nolle prosequi disposition; the
District was therefore excluded from the chart above.

18

S.D. Indiana
N.D. Florida
N.D. Alabama
S.D. Illinois
New Hampshire

18.9%
24.7%
24.8%
25.2%
25.7%

Meanwhile, according to the AOUSC Database, the judicial districts with
the highest dismissal rates were:
Table II: Federal Judicial Districts with the Highest Charge-Dismissal Rates
in Pled Cases, AOUSC Data, FY 2003–FY200962
District

FY 2003–FY2009
Dismissal Rate
56.3%
53.6%
51.6%
51.5%
50.7%
50.6%
50.0%
49.2%
48.9%
48.4%

N.D. West Virginia
Kansas
Vermont
Minnesota
M.D. Pennsylvania
E.D. New York
S.D. Alabama
E.D. Arkansas
W.D. Virginia
E.D. California

Of course, charge dismissals on their own provide a weak proxy for
overcharging. The volume and rate of charge dismissals in pled cases depends on
many extrinsic matters, such as the types of charges that tend to be filed in a
jurisdiction. Prosecutors in the District of New Mexico, for example, might
dismiss few charges in pled cases because they file a large share of their cases
under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (re-entry into the United States by a removed felon),63 a
federal crime that is so simple to prove it rarely implicates any charge
bargaining.64 A large number of count-heavy fraud prosecutions in the Eastern
District of New York, by comparison, may inflate that jurisdiction’s chargedismissal rate.

62

Id.
With a few exceptions, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 makes it a federal crime for someone who “has been
denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the United States while an order of
exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding,” to thereafter enter, attempt to enter, or be at any time
found in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006).
64
Kyle Graham, Crimes, Widgets, and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge Content,
Pleas, and Trials, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1617–19 (2012).
63
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Furthermore, not all charge dismissals in connection with plea deals
bespeak overcharging. For example, state prosecutors routinely allege two counts
in driving under the influence cases. The first alleges that the defendant drove a
vehicle while “under the influence” of alcohol.65 The second charges that the
defendant drove with a blood-alcohol concentration at or over a certain level.66
Most of the time, more than adequate proof supports both counts, and the same
result typically obtains at sentencing regardless of whether the defendant pleads
guilty to one of these charges, or both. Prosecutors, therefore, usually gain no
substantial plea-bargaining leverage by alleging both crimes. In these cases, the
prosecutors commonly accept a guilty plea to one of these charges or the other,
and dismiss the remaining charge as a pro forma matter. Even assuming a
prosecutor filed such a case knowing that it was substantially certain to resolve
with a guilty plea to one count that contemplated the dismissal of the other
charge, this knowledge would not amount to overcharging. For one thing, there
charges would not be disproportionate to the defendant’s conduct; for another, the
necessary prosecutorial scienter would not exist.67
B. “Most Serious” Charge Substitutions
If the dismissal of any charge pursuant to a plea does not, on its own,
provide an especially meaningful indication of overcharging, perhaps a narrowed
focus on the dismissal of “serious” charges will. These data may not be available,
or easy to collect, for all jurisdictions. But as indicated above, the AOUSC
Dataset identifies the “most serious” offense at initial charging, as well as the
“most serious” offense at the time of case termination. Since charge dismissals
represent the most common explanation for these substitutions, charting the
discrepancies between these two offenses might provide a rough sense of the
frequency of at least one form of deliberate overcharging.68
The following tables indicate how often, among pled cases, the charge
identified as the most serious charging offense in a given case retained that status
at the time of case termination. The data are broken out on a year-by-year basis, to
highlight any inconsistencies across the studied time period. In the table

65

E.g., California Vehicle Code § 23152(a) (WEST 2000).
E.g.. California Vehicle Code § 23152(b) (WEST 2000).
67
Similar circumstances often arise when defendants are charged with both grand theft
(e.g., California Penal Code § 487(a) (WEST 2000)) and possession of the stolen property (e.g.,
California Penal Code § 496 (WEST 2000)).
68
See Ron Sylvester, Prosecutors’ Conviction Rate Falls, THE WICHITA EAGLE (Wichita,
KS), Aug. 11, 2002, at 1A (reporting the results of a study in which a conviction on the most
serious charge in a case served as a proxy for proper charging).
66
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immediately below, the names of districts that also appeared on the list of districts
with low charge-dismissal rates are presented in bold text.
Table III: Federal Judicial Districts with the Highest Retention Rates of Most
Serious Charging Offenses in Pled Cases, FY 2003–FY200969
District
S.D. Indiana
Rhode
Island
Maine
S.D. Illinois
Northern
Mariana
Islands
New Mexico
C.D. Illinois
N.D.
Alabama
S.D.
California
E.D.
Pennsylvania
All Districts

2003
97.6%
93.0%

2004
95.4%
96.3%

2005
97.9%
93.1%

2006
97.3%
96.9%

2007
93.9%
96.4%

2008
95.6%
98.9%

2009
93.5%
96.4%

Total
95.9%
95.8%

91.2%
94.8%
100%

93.4%
94.4%
89.7%

96.1%
95.3%
95.5%

97.7%
95.7%
93.8%

97.3%
94.8%
100%

94.8%
91.1%
94.7%

94.2%
93.8%
85.7%

95.0%
94.3%
93.4%

82.1%
95.1%
93.8%

92.5%
91.9%
93.7%

94.0%
93.0%
92.8%

95.4%
92.3%
95.4%

94.4%
92.9%
91.3%

95.5%
93.1%
92.8%

97.0%
94.6%
92.9%

93.4%
93.3%
93.2%

91.1%

90.0%

89.9%

91.8%

92.4%

93.6%

93.8%

92.1%

90.1%

90.3%

91.5%

93.1%

92.7%

94.1%

93.7%

92.1%

79.6%

81.9%

82.8%

83.3%

83.9%

84.0%

85.3%

83.1%

Meanwhile, the judicial districts that experienced the highest rates of
“most serious” charge substitution (with the names of districts that appeared on
the list of jurisdictions with the highest “generic” dismissal rates being
highlighted in bold text) were:
Table IV: Federal Judicial Districts with the Lowest Retention Rates of Most
Serious Charging Offenses in Pled Cases, FY 2003–FY200970
District
N.D. West
Virginia
W.D.
Washington
E.D.
California
E.D. New
York
E.D. Texas
69
70

2003
48.6%

2004
58.3%

2005
63.8%

2006
62.6%

2007
62.2%

2008
56.5%

2009
72.8%

Total
61.2%

64.9%

69.7%

72.4%

65.8%

73.6%

65.7%

67.1%

68.4%

58.1%

60.0%

71.7%

72.4%

67.3%

75.9%

77.6%

69.0%

62.5%

71.8%

69.3%

68.2%

71.6%

72.7%

70.4%

69.1%

67.5%

64.8%

69.7%

68.2%

72.9%

73.6%

72.5%

70.2%

AOUSC Database, supra note 58.
AOUSC Database, supra note 58.
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Oregon
Kansas
S.D. Florida
E.D.
Arkansas
South
Dakota

71.4%
71.1%
59.0%
66.9%

73.0%
75.5%
67.8%
73.4%

74.0%
73.3%
68.0%
73.6%

72.5%
68.4%
69.4%
76.3%

72.1%
71.0%
76.0%
73.2%

70.8%
69.7%
77.5%
71.0%

60.9%
67.4%
80.5%
64.9%

70.6%
70.9%
71.3%
71.3%

75.9%

66.8%

69.6%

68.4%

79.0%

69.4%

71.9%

71.5%

Though the swapping of “most serious” charges in pled cases probably
provides a better proxy for overcharging than the frequency of charge dismissals
does, this metric also leaves much to be desired. For one thing, this measurement
cannot detect “horizontal” charge bargaining in situations where the prosecution
has alleged only multiple counts of a single crime, or has agreed to dismiss less
serious charges in exchange for a guilty plea to the most serious offense. Also, the
AOUSC Dataset premises the “most serious” charge designation on the base
offense level assigned to the crime under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines.71 This reliance on the Guidelines can produce misleading results in
situations where additional facts, such as the amount of illegal drugs at issue,
ultimately play a more important role in determining the defendant’s likely
sentence.
Furthermore, this reliance on base offense levels can produce haphazard
results. Vast discrepancies may appear across similarly situated judicial districts
when both districts (1) often charge identical sets of crimes, with each crime
having the same base offense level, but (2) customarily dismiss different crimes
within these sets as part of plea deals. Assume that in such a situation, the
Guidelines identify Crime A as the “more serious” of the two offenses, an
arbitrary designation. A jurisdiction that routinely dismisses Crime A instead of
Crime B as a pro forma part of plea agreements will record a very high charge
substitution rate, suggesting it routinely overcharges. A jurisdiction that dismisses
Crime B for the same reason, however, will have a very low substitution rate.
This discrepancy seems particularly unfair when, as with prosecutions under the
driving under the influence laws discussed above, the prosecution gains little to
no tactical advantage at plea bargaining from its decision to allege both crimes.
Notwithstanding these caveats, and the fact that the two datapoints are not
wholly independent from one another, the data regarding the substitution of “most
serious” charging offenses might provide a useful cross-check to the “generic”
71

The base offense level for a crime provides the starting point for sentencing calculations
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Higher base offense levels translate to lengthier
Guidelines-prescribed advisory terms. ROGER W. HAINES, JR., FRANK O. BOWMAN, III &
JENNIFER C. WOLL, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 1305 (2010).
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dismissal data. There exists significant overlap between the lists, at both extremes.
The Southern District of Indiana, the District of Rhode Island, the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, the District of Maine, the District of New Mexico, and the
Southern District of Illinois appear on both the list of jurisdictions with the lowest
dismissal rates, and the list of jurisdictions with the lowest substitution rates for
“most serious” charging offenses. At the other extreme, the Northern District of
West Virginia, the Eastern District of Arkansas, the Eastern District of California,
the Eastern District of New York, and the District of Kansas had among the
highest dismissal rates and the highest substitution rates.
C. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Dismissals
To further pin down the existence of overcharging, as opposed to
innocuous charge dismissals incident to pleas, a third metric would consider how
often prosecutors dismiss a specific crime or enhancement believed to commonly
serve as a government bargaining chip in plea negotiations. In this vein, it is
sometimes asserted72 that prosecutors often use the gun enhancement found at 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)73 to catalyze plea bargaining. This charge carries a five-year
mandatory minimum term, to run consecutively with the sentence assigned to the
underlying crime. The nature and content of the charge catalyze plea bargaining:
defendants want to eliminate the five-year term, while prosecutors are willing to
exchange its dismissal for guilty pleas to the underlying charges. The 924(c)
charge’s reputation as a plea-deal facilitator suggests that the frequency with
which prosecutors dismiss these charges might reflect prior overcharging.
Accordingly, the table below relates the federal districts with the lowest
924(c) dismissal rates in cases resolved in whole or in part by a defendant’s guilty
or nolo contendere plea. (The overall dismissal rate for 924(c) charges in these
cases during the studied time period, across all districts, was 45.5%.74) Judicial
72

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL FIREARM OFFENDERS, 1992–98
6 (2000) (discussing the frequent dismissal of 924(c) charges); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H.
Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and
its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1293 (1997) (observing that
the dismissal of provable 924(c) counts represented a common form of charge-bargaining in
federal prosecutions); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An
Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 548–49, 551–52 (1992) (remarking on the dismissal of 924(c) counts).
73
Section 924(c) of Title 18 provides that a five-year (or higher) sentence enhancement is
to be imposed upon “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an
enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for
which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or
who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006).
74
AOUSC Database, supra note 58.
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districts that appeared within either the list of districts with the lowest general
dismissal rates (Table I), or the list of districts with the lowest substitution rates
for “most serious” charges (Table III), are in bold; the names of districts that
appear on both of these other tables are in bold italics:

Table V: Federal Judicial Districts with the Lowest Dismissal Rates
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Charges in Pled Cases, FY 2003–FY200975
District

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
Dismissal Rate
0.0%
13.8%
15.0%
16.6%
16.7%
17.2%
19.5%
21.0%
24.7%
25.0%
25.0%

Northern Mariana Islands
N.D. Alabama
Maine
N.D. Florida
W.D. Arkansas
S.D. Indiana
Massachusetts
E.D. Pennsylvania
C.D. Illinois
W.D. Wisconsin
Rhode Island

The following districts, meanwhile, had the highest 924(c) dismissal rates
in cases terminated by plea. Text in bold or bold italics connotes a district’s
appearance within either the list of districts with the highest general dismissal
rates (Table II) or the list of districts with the highest substitution rates for “most
serious” charges (Table IV) (bold text), or on both lists (bold italics):
Table VI: Federal Judicial Districts with the Highest Dismissal Rates
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Charges in Pled Cases, FY 2003–FY200976
District

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
Dismissal Rate
73.0%
70.7%
66.9%
66.3%
65.5%
65.2%

E.D. Arkansas
S.D. Georgia
Minnesota
M.D. Pennsylvania
Vermont
Arizona
75
76

AOUSC Database, supra note 58.
AOUSC Database, supra note 58.
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E.D. Washington
E.D. Texas
E.D. New York
Oregon

64.4%
64.2%
63.8%
62.8%

D. Combined Results
Summing the results of these three metrics reveals those districts that have
compiled particularly distinctive charge-dismissal records over the studied time
period.77 The lowest dismissal rates in connection with pled cases belong to the
District of Maine, the Southern District of Indiana, the District of Rhode Island,
the Northern District of Alabama, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. These
low dismissal rates may owe to a shared hard line on plea bargaining, it may
bespeak careful charging practices, or it may owe to altogether different factors.
Yet if overcharging represents a concern, these districts seem to hold promise as
potential sources of best charging practices.
At the other extreme, the highest amassed dismissal rates belong to the
Eastern District of Arkansas, the Eastern District of New York, the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, the District of Minnesota, and the Northern District of
West Virginia. Once again, there may exist good explanations for the high
dismissal rates in these jurisdictions, independent of overcharging. Alternatively
or in addition, changes in policy or personnel since the studied time period may
have altered the charge-dismissal profiles of these offices. Yet the evidence
suggests that a comprehensive, critical study of overcharging in the federal system
might begin with these districts, to ascertain what accounts for their frequent
dismissal of generic, serious, and “bargaining chip” offenses.
III.

CONCLUSION

To reiterate, a district’s position at either extreme of the aforementioned
metrics does not establish that it employed or still employs “good” or “bad”
charging practices. Limitations of and errors within the data, idiosyncrasies in
AOUSC coding, variations in docket composition across judicial districts, the
relative strength or weakness of the defense bar in a judicial district, and the
possible influence on the data of cases prosecuted by attorneys out of “Main

77

The discrepancies across the tables also provide some useful insights into the limitations
of each metric. While the District of New Mexico, for example, had a very low “general”
dismissal rate in pled cases, there was reason to believe that this rating did not bespeak
parsimonious charging. The District’s frequent dismissal of § 924(c) charges in pled cases—it
ranks 50th among judicial districts in this respect—seems to substantiate this suspicion. AOUSC
Database, supra note 58.
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Justice,” as opposed to a local U.S. Attorney’s office, all certainly could, and
probably did, affect the results. Furthermore, low dismissal rates may be just as
consistent with overcharging coupled with a consistently hard line on plea
bargaining, as they are with not overcharging at all.
Also, there exists every possibility that other, better measurements of
overcharging exist. But that is the very point of this essay. The discussion above
points toward a road forward, but it does not purport to specify its precise
direction. At present, the conversation about overcharging remains in a protean
stage. The lack of a consensus as to what the term means has deterred any effort
to track and measure the practice. Within increasing precision as to what
overcharging means may come enhanced interest in charting the phenomenon,
and in devising ways to address it—if that is our goal.
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